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Abstract: 
This article argues that the role of Private Security Contractors in Darfur reflects and 
reinforces neo-liberal governmentality in contemporary security governance. It is an 
argument (in line with other articles in this special issue) which is more interested in 
discussing how the privatization of security alters security practices (including those 
involving states) than in thinking about their impact on an idealised public monopoly on 
the use of force. To make its point, the article begins by drawing on Foucauldian work 
to clarify the meaning of neo-liberal governmentality in security. It underlines that 
governance is increasingly taking place through a set of (quasi-) markets, it is marked by 
entrepreneurial values, and a hands off approach to governance. We then discuss the 
way this overall change is reflected in and reinforced by the role of private security 
contractors in Darfur. Drawing on a framework of analysis inspired by Bourdieu, we 
show that neo-liberal governmentality is reflected in the dispositions of security actors 
as well as in their relative positions. The resulting security practices reinforce 
dispositions and positions that reproduce neo-liberal governmentality. Looking at these 
processes is necessary to understand the role of private security contractors in Darfur. 
But more than this, practices in Darfur entrench neo-liberal governmentality in security 
more generally. The managerial and ‘de-politicizing’ approach to security in Darfur 
displaces alternative views not only in the Darfuri context. It is taken into other contexts 
where it bolsters neo-liberal governmentality. This spiralling neo-liberal 
governmentality rather than diminished state control and authority is, we argue, the most 
significant consequence of the presence of private security contractors in Darfur. 
 
 1
Introduction 
Since 2003 the violence and extensive human rights abuse in the Darfur region (Western 
Sudan) has received considerable international attention. A ‘long war’ of attrition in which the 
government in Khartoum (and its colonial predecessors) have neglected and oppressed a 
region that has responded by ruling itself is the background of the present conflict (Flint and 
de Waal 2005; Prunier 2005). The latest wave of open violence opposes the Janjaweed militia 
and two rebel movements protesting oppression and neglect: the JEM (Justice and Equality 
Movement associated with the Zaghawa population) and the SLM (Sudan Liberation 
Movement associated with the Fur and Masalit populations). In February 2003, the rebels 
groups attacked government forces and installation. According to the government, the 
Janjaweed militias took the situation in their own hands in an attempt to defend themselves 
against the rebels. According to all other accounts, the government accepted, coordinated, 
organised, paid and militarily supported the militia. The consequence has been what Colin 
Powel, then undersecretary of state, termed genocide. Looting, raping, and mass killings have 
displaced some 2,4 million persons to refugee camps in Darfur and another 250,000 to camps 
in Chad (Human Rights Watch). In total, some 3 million people are dependent on 
international emergency aid (Annan 2006).  
Throughout this crisis international involvement has been extensive. International 
observers and monitors, aid and human rights organizations have documented and informed 
about the evolving conflict. The international community has tried to mediate the ongoing 
conflict. Besides mediating in the conflict, the international community has been militarily 
involved. The African Union has deployed a 3000 men strong peacekeeping force – the AMIS 
(the African Union Mission in Sudan) – which is indirectly supported by the UNMIS.1 
Moreover, NATO has agreed to back up the force and the Security Council is currently under 
strong pressure to clarify the UN engagement in the conflict. And, as in all other major 
contemporary conflicts, private security contractors have been present in the Darfur crisis. 
Pacific Engineers (PAE), DynCorp and Medical Solutions Services have worked for 
humanitarians and armed forces. Contractors emphasize that the ‘first people on the ground in 
Darfur were the employees of private firms’, they see their role as essential and would like to 
increase it (Pugliese 2005). Blackwater has even gone so far as to suggest that contractors 
                                                 
1 UN Mission in Sudan monitors the ‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’ between the government and the 
southern rebel groups, but does not cover Darfur. 
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(from Blackwater specifically) should be allowed to take on a more extensive and 
independent peace-keeping role in the conflict. 
The private contractor presence runs against established international practice. Since the 
mid-19th Century military operations are the preserve of state armed forces (Thomson 1994). 
Even if conventions banning mercenarism – in particular the UN Convention against the use 
and financing of mercenaries and the AU Convention – have not been signed by all states and 
are rather ineffective and even if a market for military services has never ceased to exist, in 
principle private military operations are illegitimate in international society. This makes it 
paradoxical that private contractors in a situation such as Darfur not only inform about their 
activities there, but advertise them loudly and make general demands for an increased role. 
The contractors face a rather serious legitimacy problem: they are balancing on the fine line 
between being (legitimate) providers of security services and being (illegitimate) providers of 
military services. The gist of our argument is that to understand the paradoxical behaviour 
private contractors in Darfur it is necessary to situate it in the context of evolving security 
governance. The shift in security governance towards Foucauldian neo-liberal 
governmentality sets the context for explaining this behaviour. This context alters the 
practices of actors (private and public) in the field of security. This in turn reshapes security 
governance. It reinforces a depoliticized understanding of security central to neo-liberal 
governance not only in Darfur but more generally.  
 
 
Neo-Liberal Governmentality in Security 
As Abrahamsen and Williams argue in this volume, ‘the rise of private authority is part of a 
broader shift in the relationship between the public and private sectors, and involves 
substantial transformations in the form and exercise of public as well as private power.’ This 
broader shift can be (and has been) named and thought of in many different ways. The name 
we want to introduce for our discussion is ‘neo-liberal governmentality’.2 We want to suggest 
that this specifically Foucauldian name and the approach that goes with it are particularly 
helpful in capturing the transformation of security governance. One reason is that it moves the 
focus away from a formalistic state-centred notion of government to governance practices. A 
second is that the historical accounts of governmentality are useful for capturing the 
specificity of present neo-liberal forms of governmentality which we argue are visible in the 
                                                 
2 For more elaborate discussions of this notions and its import for understanding security see e.g. Huysmans 
(2006) and van Munster (2005). 
 3
field of security where its characteristic approach to government, emphasis on entrepreneurial 
values and the development of quasi markets are reflected and reproduced. 
Thinking about security governance in terms of governmentality makes it possible to 
move beyond the state-centred and formalistic understanding of governance. The notion 
‘governmentality’ was introduced by Foucault to capture different historical modalities of 
government while strongly signalling a wish to avoid privileging the state or its executive 
body (Foucault 2003)3. The central idea is that the government that matters is that of the 
discourses that constitute actors and their practices. This government is expressed and 
produced through multiple forms of subjugation of subjects and even more, it is inherent in 
subject identity. Governmentality is in other words expressed in a combination of 
decentralized activities and practices. It is about how the conduct of people is modulated by 
means of private and public procedures, practices and technologies (Foucault 1991, 103). The 
state, then, cannot be taken as the locus of all (sovereign) power but only as a domain and 
principle of application.4
 
[T]he question is no longer one of accounting for government in terms of the “power of the 
State”, but of ascertaining how, and to what extent, the state is articulated into the activity of 
government: what relations are established between political and other authorities; what funds, 
forces, persons, knowledge or legitimacy are utilized; and by means of what devices and 
techniques are these different tactics made operable (Rose and Miller 1992, 177).  
 
In order to think about the implications of private security we find this focus helpful since it 
directs attention away from whether or not the state is losing control/authority to the more 
substantial issue of what privatization means for practices in the security field.  
 More specifically we find that the substantive account given of these evolving forms of 
government useful for capturing the specific nature of current ‘neo-liberal’ governmentality. 
In the genealogy of governmentalization, liberalism is an art of governing that emerged in the 
18th and 19th century in response to more interventionist modes of governing in the 16th and 
                                                 
3 Foucault gives the following definition of the term: ‘By governmentality I mean three things […] I mean the set 
of procedures, analysis and reflections, the calculations and the tactics that make possible the exercise of the 
specific (although very complex) power which has as its aim the population, as its key form of knowledge 
political economy and as essential technical instrument security measures. Secondly, by ‘governmentality’ I 
mean the tendency, the line of force, tending since a very long time to establish in the Western world, the type of 
power which one could call ‘government’ as dominant in relation to other forms or power: sovereignty, 
discipline […] Finally, by governmentality I think on must understand the process, or rather the result of the 
process, by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages and the administrative state of the 15th and 16th 
Centuries is governmentaized little by little (Foucault 2004b, 112 our translation). 
4 Foucault rhetorically asks: ‘What if the state was nothing but a way of governing; if the state was nothing but a 
type of governmentality?’ (Foucault 2004a 252, our translation). 
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the 17th century (Foucault 2004a). Liberalism did not supplant earlier forms of government. 
Rather, ‘we have in fact a triangle: sovereignty, discipline and governmental management; a 
management whose principal target is the population and whose essential mechanisms are 
security measures’ (Foucault 2004a, 111, our translation). However, by contrast to earlier 
forms of government, liberalism emphasised the limitation of direct state intervention. Order 
should not be manufactured through centralised intervention in the affairs of society (Foucault 
2000, 352). Rather, the crux of the liberal art of government is ‘not to impede in the course of 
things, but to ensure the play of ‘natural’ and ‘necessary’ modes of regulations: manipuler, 
susiter, faciliter, laissez-faire’ (Foucault, cited in Gordon 1991: 17, emphasis in original). 
Liberalism in other words, draws on indirect techniques and a hands-off approach to 
government which ‘involves less a retreat from governmental ‘intervention’ than a re-
inscription of the techniques and forms of expertise required for the exercise of government’ 
(Barry et al. 1996, 14). 
Neo-liberalism gives an entrepreneurial twist to the general liberal hands off approach 
to government by emphasising the creation of quasi-markets and entrepreneurial values. It 
subject existing governmental practices to modes of expertise that are drawn from the private 
sector with the result that the social is increasingly reconfigured as a series of markets and 
quasi-markets: 
 
Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. They empower 
citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy into the community. They measure the 
performance of their agencies, focusing not on inputs but on outcomes … They decentralize 
authority, embracing participatory government. They prefer market mechanisms to bureaucratic 
mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services but on catalyzing all 
sectors – public, private and voluntary – into action to solve their community’s problem 
(Osborne and Gaebler, cited in Du Gay 2002, 17-18). 
 
Neo-liberal governmentality situates human activity within an economic calculus. It relocates 
activities from the public realm to the market by means of direct privatisation, public/private 
partnerships, outsourcing, the creation of new markets, the making of internal markets and the 
establishment of conditions for competitive success (Clarke 2004, 35-6). Both public and 
private actors are responsibilized through neo-liberal tools such as benchmarking, ‘best 
practice’ schemes, performance indicators and auditing. These have a disciplining function 
insofar as they make free agents behave according to formal standards that ensure efficiency, 
quality and effectiveness measured in terms of productivity. They are technologies of 
responsibilization, that shape how private and public actors understand and govern 
themselves. 
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Far from new in other fields,5 the appropriation of the neo-liberal modality of governing 
in the field of international security is of recent date. This might seem paradoxical since 
security and risk technologies are an essential part of neo-liberal governmentality generally. 
However, the centrality of state-based thinking and the strong affirmation of state control over 
security has limited the impact of these techniques on the security sector itself. During the 
bipolar Cold War, the security order was closely tied to the governmental paradigm of 
sovereignty. The focus on nuclear weapons and the great power competition made 
(international) security appear as a quintessentially public responsibility to be provided 
through practices as the arms race, diplomacy, alliance-building, containment, border control 
and policing. With the end of the Cold War this changed. As the binary great power 
competition ceased to monopolize attention, discourses on globalization and discourses about 
alternative security threats (failed states, immigration, terrorism, etc.) made their way into the 
field of security. Security professionals played a central role in bringing about this shift (Bigo 
2000) which has led to far reaching questioning of the traditional state domination of the 
security field and to a ‘normalization’ marked by the growing centrality of neo-liberal 
governmentality. 
The governmentalization of the field of security has been quick. The domination of 
neo-liberal discourses of New Public Management in other areas of public administration and 
the creation of transnational discourse communities (Hansen and Salskov-Iversen 2005) is 
part of the explanation. It provides the general context and vocabulary for changes in the 
security field. It also creates the impression that the security field is ‘lagging behind’. Neo-
liberal governmentality in the field of security is consequently being implemented with the 
zealousness of the newly converted (Markusen 2003). Moreover, the self-reinforcing nature 
of the process is equally important for the scope and speed of change. The mobilization of 
insecurity and fear are open to the construction of new problems and the marketing of new 
solutions. The market of ‘security’ generates its own demand insofar as the social perception 
of threat, created through the marketing of security solutions which is also the production of 
fear, becomes a function of the security mobilization itself (Leander, 2005).  
Neo-liberal governmentality in the field of security takes two concrete expressions. 
First, governance through quasi-markets has resulted in extensive privatization. This process 
                                                 
5 As governmentality scholars have pointed out, neoliberal modes of governing already operate in a wide variety 
of social fields varying from local government (Stenson and Watt 1999), social welfare (Dean 1999), crime 
(Garland 2001), insurance (Ericson et al. 2003), European integration (Walters and Haahr 2005) and 
globalization (Larner and Walters 2004). 
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has gone further in some countries and it has obviously taken a variety of forms depending on 
policy traditions and context (Kaldor, Albrecht et al. 1998) as shown by the contrasting 
patters of privatization in the US, France, Russia and Iran. This said, the general trend of 
functional specialization and commodification of security solutions has made complex 
networks combining public and private actors pivotal in the provision of security services. 
Second, (and immediately linked) neo-liberal governmentality is expressed in the 
responsibilization of the private and public sphere in an attempt to shape and steer their 
conduct. Neo-liberal technologies such as benchmarking, ‘best practice’, performance 
indicators and auditing do not just increase efficiency. They also have a disciplining function 
insofar as their aim is to make agents behave according to formal standards that ensure 
efficiency, quality and effectiveness measured in terms of productivity. These indicators have 
a disciplining function in that they shape how private and public actors understand and govern 
themselves.  
For the purpose of explaining the role of private security contractors in Darfur, 
reference to this context of neo-liberal governmentality is useful. However, it needs to be 
contextualised. The effects and modalities of neo-liberal governmentality are uneven and 
varying across fields. Neo-liberalism is no universal practice with homogenizing tendencies 
across fields. Rather it should be conceived of as a system of discursive regulation that has 
been adopted, appropriated and modified in different fields. In order to explore how it has 
been appropriated in the context of concern to us, we want to look at the role of contractors in 
the Darfur crisis through Bourdieusian lenses. For whereas the notion of governmentality is 
useful to describe the ‘idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying 
it’ (Rose and Miller 1992, 178), Bourdieu’s social theory helps analyze how such rationalities 
are actualized on the micro-sociological level in concrete practices.  
 
 
Private Security in Darfur: Reflecting Struggles over Dispositions and Positions in the 
Field of Security 
 
To understand how it is possible that private contractors are not only present, but loudly 
advocate an expanded role for themselves, in a war-like situation such as that in Darfur we 
suggest the usefulness of thinking about change in the ‘field’ of security. The evolving neo-
liberal governmentality in the security sector is reshaping the dispositions through which 
security actors understand their own field and their respective roles in it (or their habitus). 
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Neo-liberal governmentality is also producing changes in the value of different forms 
(symbolic, cultural, social and economic) of capital since the value of any resource is in itself 
defined by field specific inter-subjectively shared understandings (dispositions). The 
consequence is a remapping of the positions in the field. A change in the dispositions of 
actors and in their relative (power) positions spells changes in social practices.6 We will trace 
these changes by showing the extent to which key neo-liberal governmentality techniques 
weigh in favour of private contractors in Darfur who (of course) do try to get the most of this 
shifting context. Specifically, we argue that private contractors speak from an expert position 
on the Darfur conflict because of the working of responsibilization and privatization on 
security actors’ dispositions and their relative power positions. We contend that this is the 
backdrop against which their noisy advertising of their own position must be understood. 
Responsibilization is a pivotal technique of neo-liberal governmentality. It is crucial to 
the withdrawal of the state and politics as the responsibility of government is decentralised 
and located at the level of various social agents. In the Darfur context, this also holds. 
Responsibilization is brought in by a framing of the crisis in market terms as if there was a 
given demand for security services that suppliers have a responsibility to meet. There is 
demand for security on behalf of the Darfur population as well as on behalf of a variety of 
firms, NGOs, aid agencies and governments working in the region. Suppliers of security have 
a responsibility to answer this demand; a responsibility now enshrined at the international 
level by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. This makes it logical for 
contractors to argue that they are willing to fill ‘the gap’ between the supply and the demand 
for security services on behalf of NGOs, firms as well as locals and public armed forces 
(Martinet 2004; Pugliese 2005). They are offering to take responsibility for security 
governance in a situation where it is indeed much needed.  
The fact that states do not adequately assume responsibility in this situation further 
weighs in the private contractors favour. Contractors meet a ‘demand’ for security services 
which public forces are neither willing nor able to offer. Indeed, the ‘responsibility’ of the 
private sector in security is heightened by the imagery of the invisible hand directing real 
world complexity far more effectively than administrative planning. Characteristically, the 
incapacity and unwillingness of the public is contrasted with the efficiency and leanness of 
the private. Hence, an industry lobbyist explained in a congressional hearing that the UN is 
                                                 
6 Field, habitus (dispositions), positions and practices referred to here are drawn from Bourdieu inspired work in 
sociology. Bourdieu summarizes their relationship as: [(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu 1979: 
112).  
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not a ‘poor man’s NATO’ but relies on a ‘hodgepodge of militaries, using different 
equipment, communications gear, and languages. Military coordination is the exception not 
the rule. And mandate interpretation varies dramatically between different nationalities’ 
(Brooks 20047). Underlining the efficiency of private firms Erik Prince, CEO of Blackwater, 
claimed that there is no ‘need for an 8000 peacekeeper force. You need an NGO-type QRF’ 
and then went on to explain that private firms can provide such a QRF with a better tooth-to-
tail-ratio than public operations’ (quoted in Hodge 2005).The conclusion readily reached is 
that if private contractors are willing to take responsibility, it is the responsibility of the rest of 
the world to accept this willingness. A dual responsibilization created through the technique 
of governing through quasi-markets in other words reconfigures the dispositions of actors in 
the security field. The role of contractors in Darfur should be understood with reference to 
this. 
Second, the privileging of privatization and entrepreneurial values, central to neo-
liberal governmentality, in and of themselves gears the security field to favour contractors. 
This privileging is stronger in the security field than elsewhere. Private military outfits are 
assumed to be cost-effective and successful whereas public ones are not. A conclusion 
reached on the basis of a systematic dismissal of evidence to the contrary as anecdotal and 
marginal. As a close study of transformation in the defence sector points out, in defence 
matters the  
 
[t]he sophistication of social science methodology applied in other areas of public-sector 
privatisation. Anecdotes about successful cases are often reported as the basis for advocating 
further privatisation. Although one hears about failures, it is difficult to find written accounts 
similar to those available from independent analysts working on other sectors (Markusen 
2003, 483). 
 
The assessments of the gains from privatization are narrowly drawn (not assessing public 
costs including investments, or costs of monitoring and excluding non-economic costs), 
largely prospective rather than retrospective (based on what the private sector promised not 
what it did), and confined chiefly to cost and not quality assessment (Markusen 1998).  
This general neo-liberal ‘bias in favour of private business’ is also palpable in the 
Darfur context. It is visible in adoption of unorthodox contracting practices used elsewhere 
for security contractors including ‘cost-plus contracts’ combined with a lack of oversight, 
                                                 
7 Doug Brooks heads the International Peacekeeping Operations Association (IPOA) which lobbies for an 
extended role for the ‘peace and stability industry’ in peacekeeping operations. 
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auditing and proper contracting procedures.8 The joint DynCorp and Pacific Architects & 
Engineers contract, to support the AU troops in Darfur is a case in point. It has been described 
as an ‘indefinite delivery, indefinite quality’ contract (Chatterjee 2004). More broadly, the 
bias for private business shapes the context in which contractors present their role and 
advocate its enlargement. We need to consider these dispositions to explain that Chris Taylor 
of Blackwater could make the following statement to a university audience: 
 
Three thousand African Union troops were deployed in Darfur were violence is 
widespread and the range of human rights violations is inconceivable. These 3000 AU 
troops deployed to areas where, not 300 yards away, unimaginable violence was being 
visited on innocent, defenceless victims but the AU troops were specifically prevented 
from intervening and protecting the helpless. Their mission was to protect UN 
observers […next paragraph] Send 10.000 UN troops to Darfur? A colossal waste of 
money. You do not create security and peace by throwing more mediocre, 
uncommitted people into the fray. 1000-2000 professional contractors could perform 
those same stability operations, safely turning over the operation to the UN and other 
NGOs to perform post-conflict operations. That is what they do best (Taylor 2005). 
 
Note that we move from saying that the AU troops did not intervene – because of their 
restrictive mandate – to saying that public troops are ‘mediocre and uncommitted’ and should 
limit their activities to post-conflict activities, leaving peacekeeping to the private sector.  
The evolving disposition of actors in the security field to frame security provision as a 
matter of responsibility best taken on by private actors is central to shifting the relative 
positions in the security field. It is no longer the case that private contractors speak from a 
marginal position in the field. On the contrary, the very fact of being a private security 
contractor is increasingly a source of symbolic capital. Contractors increasingly resemble a 
caste of new security experts. It is common to hear public officials underscore the efficiency 
of private contractors (e.g. Royce 2004; Leander 2006: chapter 5). For example, with 
reference to stabilizing the situation in Darfur Charles Snyder (the director of Sudan programs 
for the State department) explained that ‘Private companies can do the job more quickly and 
efficiently in the short term than a government bureaucracy’ (Chatterjee 2004). 
 A correlate of these changes is that contractors take on a growing number of roles in 
the security sector. Darfur well illustrates the point. Private contractors are providing logistics 
for troops and security for a variety of organizations, something treated as unproblematic as 
                                                 
8 A cost plus contract is one where the firm is paid on the basis of its declared costs including a profit margin. 
There has been extensive discussion of the difficulties of the contractual practices in the sector. For general 
discussions see e.g. Singer (2003). For a discussion of Iraq (which has received by far the most attention, see 
GAO (2005) and Isenberg (2004). 
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visible in the lack of concern over PAE, DynCorp or Medical Support Solutions in Darfur. 
But the shift in positions is even more clearly reflected in the fact that private contractors are 
taking over roles that have formerly been the reserve of public or at least civilian 
organizations. An illustration of this is provided by PAE’s contract to provide staff for a 
Civilian Protection Monitoring Team in Darfur. Concretely, the team is monitoring human 
rights in Sudan under a state Department contract (Chatterjee 2004). The growing roles 
translate as more contracts for the contractors. Security contractors have not only gained 
symbolic capital but also economic capital to strengthen their position in the field of security. 
This expanding role for private contractors grants the security contractors a position of 
authority. They become experts when speaking about the Darfur issue. This is partly so 
because hen private contractors take over an activity they gain direct control and insight over 
what is actually happening on the ground. They decide on the implementation. When 
DynCorp provides logistics for the AU peacekeepers in Darfur it is the key source of 
information about what kind of materials are needed, in which quantities and from where they 
should be imported. DynCorp is the expert par excellence on its own business as firms 
generally are. In addition to this, DynCorp gains more general authority to inform about the 
situation on the ground in Darfur. It is working there its employees know what they talk 
about. They can demand to be respected for their expert understanding of the security 
situation in Darfur. Finally, very often private contractors are charged with analyzing and 
informing about developments. They are hired as consultants or as experts or as trainers and 
hence specifically asked to shape the understanding of a situation. In Darfur, PAE is put in 
charge of monitoring human rights and is in effect asked to provide and shape the general 
understanding of the situation. Private contractors would also like to see their role in training 
peacekeepers involved in the conflict expanded.  
Private contractors’ status as ‘experts’ is mirrored in their growing visibility in public 
debate, including that surrounding Darfur. Private contractors have given a string of public 
lectures where they have drawn attention to the plight of Darfuris in rather general terms. 
Similarly, Doug Brooks has been invited to a Congressional hearing on the topic of 
peacekeeping where special attention was paid to Darfur. However, the most interesting 
example is the petition addressed to the US president and the members of the US congress by 
the contractor lobby organization. The petition demands ‘the use of humanitarian and military 
aid to Sudan’ and is based on a general analysis the situation in Darfur (IPOA 2005). There is 
no specific reference to the role private security contractors. It is interesting precisely because 
it illustrates both the degree to which contractors (in this case through their lobby 
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organization) are becoming respected commentators on security matters in general and the 
degree to which private contractors are aware of the importance of shaping security 
understandings in general. 
The elevation of private security contractors and their representatives to an expert 
status, with a recognised authority to participate in the overall formulation of security policy 
marks a shift in the security field. In this section we have argued that this shift is directly tied 
to the spread of neo-liberal governmentality techniques to the security field. We have traced 
the role of responsibilization and privatization in re-modelling dispositions and re-shuffling 
positions in this field with constant reference to the example of the role that private 
contractors have in the Darfur conflict. In fact, we contend that this role only makes sense 
with reference to the shifts in the security field. In tracing change we have emphasised the 
shifts in dispositions and positions that make private contractors increasingly visible, audible 
and privileged. We obviously do not contend that change is without friction and struggle. 
Some governments have been unwilling to allow private sector to assume responsibility 
and/or to expand the scope of private contractor presence. South Africa and France are cases 
to the point. Similarly, (parts of) public military and security establishments have reacted 
contested and struggled against the ongoing changes (Guillroy 2005). Exploring these 
struggles in detail would be extremely useful for analyzing the process of change in more 
detail and for clarifying which countries, groups, and people win and lose in the process. 
However, we do not want to go down this path. Rather, we want to discuss the broader 
implications of the change analysed – and more specifically the extent to which the role of 
private security contractors in Darfur do not only reflect but actually also entrench neo-liberal 
governmentality in the security field.  
 
 
Private Security in Darfur, De-politicization and the Entrenchment of Neo-Liberal 
Governmentality 
 
The presence of private security contractors in Darfur and their advocacy of an enlarged role 
for themselves in that conflict not only reflect neo-liberal governmentality in the security 
field: it also reinforces it. It becomes part of a spiralling self-reinforcing process by which 
neo-liberal governmentality tends to become dominant. It does so by contributing to the de-
politicization of the public realm. Security is technocratized or perhaps more adequately 
‘militarized’ as political options are crowded out together with related discussions about 
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priorities. De-politicization in turn triggers and justifies further state retrenchment and 
reliance on neo-liberal hands off governmentality techniques operating through markets. We 
focus primarily on the field of security in Darfur. However, we underscore that the practices 
in Darfur refashion the more general process of neo-liberal governmentality. Arguments and 
‘lessons’, dispositions and resources from Darfur are used well beyond the Darfur context 
itself and contribute to entrenching neo-liberal governmentality also elsewhere. 
 The presence and weight of private contractors in Darfur has the consequence of 
limiting the role of politics, understood as deliberation in the public realm, surrounding the 
conflict. A key reason is the way the use of force is regulated institutionally. Uses of force 
involving the (public) military trigger public political debate in a way that use of force 
involving private contractors does not. The reason is not that private contractors are 
unregulated but rather that the regulation is mainly administrative and respectful of private 
business confidentiality. It is not designed to trigger public discussion. Private contractors are 
therefore classically used in covert operations and the possibility of circumventing political 
control and public attention is a key reason for relying on private firms (Silverstein 2000). 
This situation contrasts starkly with the regulations of (public) military intervention abroad. 
Here regulation is based on politics. The very idea is that troop involvement should – as a 
matter of normality – set oversight mechanisms in motion and trigger political debate about 
the problem at hand. This is at the heart of the political and institutional arrangements 
regulating the use of force in most countries and those who do not have such institutional 
arrangements are pressured to develop them (Luckham 20039).  
In situations such as that in Darfur, where private contractors play a prominent role, this 
difference in institutional forms of regulation has the effect that the political mechanisms for 
controlling and debating the use of force are not set in motion.10 Some (in traditional fashion) 
read this as the key reason for the use of contractors in the conflict in the first place ‘why are 
we using private contractors to do peace negotiations in Sudan? […] Think of this as 
somewhere between a cover program run by the CIA and an over programme run by the 
United States Agency for International Development. It is a way to avoid oversight by 
Congress’ (anonymous US government official quoted in Chatterjee 2004). Others simply 
                                                 
9 For the reasoning behind this policy and for details on one of the key groups pushing in this direction see 
DECAF: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control over Armed Forces and its publications at www.dcaf.ch/. 
10 DECAF has brought attention to the difficulty of adopting control and regulation mechanisms to situations 
where armed forces are employed in multinational operations (??). When contractors are used similar adaptation 
difficulties occur and are of course compounded if they are used in multinational contexts or generally when they 
are their principal is not the home state. 
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complain of the lack of transparency. ‘there is not a lot of transparency about these [private 
security] contracts, we don’t know how they get recruits or what kind of training they get […] 
Unlike a government agency, the private companies are not required to tell the public exactly 
what they do, often citing business confidentiality’ (Georgette Gagnon, deputy director of the 
Africa division of Human Rights Watch in Darfur quoted in Chatterjee 2004). The shared 
impression though is that the growing reliance on contractors does hamper the institutional 
mechanisms that usually trigger political discussion and control over armed operations.  
The failure of institutional mechanisms that ought to trigger debates restricts the voices 
that are heard in the political discussion. One of the key functions of public debate about 
military involvement in conflicts is that this debate ensures that the various political 
alternatives and options are raised and debated. This is a concern not only for opposition 
policy-makers, lobbyists and NGO groups who resent the concentration of information and 
control at the level of the executive and the security administration. The military 
establishment – which relies heavily on institutional mechanisms to be heard – is also 
concerned about current developments. They worry about the ‘unorthodox channels’ through 
which policy makers get their information and the risk of being pulled into (a growing 
number of) overseas adventures (Cohen 2005).  
The evolving dispositions and positions in the field of security accentuate the 
displacement of political debate away from the public realm. The expert status of private 
contractors and their increasing authority places narrow and technical discussions of conflicts 
at the centre. Contractors’ professionalism is the main reason for this: they are trained to see 
the world as security professionals, to analyse security problems and suggest solutions. The 
competitive pressure of the markets where each firm has to sell its vision goes far in 
explaining the pressure these professionals are under to promote their particular version. The 
result is that the lack of institutional prompted debate is combined with a displacement of 
broader public debate by narrow, technically oriented discussions with focus is on the 
responsibility to effectively supply the security demanded and the assumptions is that markets 
are quasi markets are best suited for the task. Disappearing from view in the process are 
voices that advocate an alternative understandings of the conflict, suggest privileging other 
means than military ones and other strategies. 
Darfur is a good illustration of this de-politicizing effect of contractor involvement. In 
the discussion about private contractors the focus on the technical security dimension linked 
to contractor involvement ‘crowds out’ discussions about the potential of alternative strategies 
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including for example a diplomacy based on oil (Prunier 2005)11 or one based on building 
alliances with Arab chieftains who have opted for staying out of the war and who have been 
advocating peaceful settlements of conflicts, such as Baggara Rizeigat (Flint and de Waal 
2005). Similarly, a narrow focus on the technical provision of security services overshadows 
the fundamental question about how highly security services should be prioritized. Even in 
Darfur this is a contentious question. Funds allocated to Darfur may used for a variety of 
purposes including private security services, support for the UNAMIS or the emergency aid 
on which 3 million people depend. Finally, the long term is marginal in the narrowly defined 
security focused on solving immediate problems. The issue of how to ‘win the peace’ 
disappears as does the impact private security providers have on the prospects of winning it. 
The likely costs of this neglect are shown by experience from other conflicts where private 
security firms become tools for a warfare-by-proxy between powerful states, companies and 
individuals (Musah 2002) and/or integrated in a social political economy based on a ‘war 
system’ (Nazih 200512). 
This de-politicization of security in turn itself becomes a reason for further expanding 
neo-liberal techniques of government in the security area. The conflict is framed in narrow 
terms where the key issue is the effective provision of security services and the main 
difficulty is finding someone willing to take responsibility for this provision. This dovetails 
with the neo-liberal emphasis on responsibilization and a hands-off approach to government. 
Private contractors can ensure that the services are efficiently provided and they offer to take 
responsibility. The emphasis on public inefficiencies including notably the lack of reaction by 
national states, NATO or the UN and the inadequacy of AU peacekeepers underscores that 
neo-liberal government techniques are not only a possible option but a better one. The 
narrowing framing makes public discussion appear superfluous at best. At worst, it is 
presented an immoral waste of time reflecting the petty concerns of outsiders who can afford 
to see people displaced and dying while they struggle to settle principled issues that are of 
concern only to themselves. The central neo-liberal concern with limiting government returns 
with vengeance.  
                                                 
11 Oil continues to be a key bone of contention in the various peace talks. The rebels accuse the oil companies in 
the region of supporting the Khartoum government and Mohammed Targoni (of the MEJ) underlines that no 
firm should be working in the region until the hostility is ended (Harel 2004). This concerns in particular the 
petroleum group ‘Cliveden’, a partly Chinese owned firm with considerable investments in Chad and Soudan, 
and offices in the Virgin Islands, Geneva and Huston (Besson 2005). 
12 The role of war as a social system are elaborated also by Duffield (2001). 
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Ultimately then the role of private security contractors in Darfur becomes part of a more 
general spiral logic: neo-liberal governmentality paves the way for a provision of private 
security services. Neo-liberal governmentality techniques shift dispositions and positions in 
ways that weigh in the private contractors favour. The expanded role of private contractors 
then drives a further entrenchment of neo-liberal governmentality. By de-politicizing the 
conflict it justifies further reliance on neo-liberal techniques. A spiral of deepening neo-liberal 
governmentality is established. This spiralling process in Darfur is reinforcing neo-liberal 
governmentality in the field of security more generally. Lessons drawn and insights gained 
reflect back on discussions about security governance in other context. Darfur has become a 
point of reference for general discussions about security governance. It confirms the general 
virtues and potential of private security contracting and underlines the inadequacy of existing 
peacekeeping operations and the governance. Firms that prove their worth in one context are 
more likely to get contracts also in another. Hence to some extent the shifts in the dispositions 
and positions gained in the Darfur conflict are imported into other security fields. More 
generally, they are likely to weigh in the direction of further privatization of security and an 
increased reliance on neo-liberal governmentality techniques. The context within which the 
developments in Darfur should be see is that where the Davos World Economic Forum has 
launched a Global Governance Initiative (in 2003) and the UN has launched the Global 
Compact both of which are private actor based institutions purporting to play an active role in 
governing security and to create a greater place for the private sector in this.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has drawn attention to the specific processes, mechanisms and practices through 
which neo-liberal governmentality is reflected and reinforced by the by private contractors’ 
role in Darfur. It took off from the question of how it is possible that private contractors can 
not only be present in military like roles in Darfur, but actually advertise this presence loudly 
and call for it to be further expanded. It suggested that the key for understanding this is the 
role of neo-liberal governmentality. Hence the article began by showing that that neo-liberal 
governmentality is increasingly present in the security sector generally as expressed by the 
centrality of privatization and of responsibilization. It then argued that the impact of these 
neo-liberal government techniques on dispositions and positions in the field of security 
systematically advantage private contractors. This is the context which makes sense of the 
role private contractors have in Darfur. We finally argued that this role in itself becomes part 
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of the processes entrenching neo-liberal governmentality in security more generally. 
Contractors gain symbolic and economic capital through their work in Darfur, this bolsters 
their authority to speak as security experts, further depoliticizing security questions, focussing 
on market based solutions.  
In discussing the reflection and reinforcement of neo-liberal governmentality in the 
presence of private security contractors in Darfur, this article purposefully avoided discussing 
whether the changes described entail more or less state control or authority. The reason is that 
we wanted to focus on what privatization entailed for security practices and we are not sure 
that a focus on the state would have been helpful here. Instead we wanted to capture how 
privatization has altered the understanding of security, the content of security policies and the 
form of security governance; hence the insistence on de-politicization, responsibilization and 
the governance through quasi-markets where private public partnerships are central. We 
would contend that this overarching shift is pivotal since it will be reflected also in state 
policies. It would of course be interesting to take this discussion further and look into what 
actors (state and non-state) lose and gain from these development. It should be clear from the 
above that the answer certainly could not take a simple state versus private actor form. Rather, 
because the privatization discussed here is promoted by (some) state actors who certainly also 
benefit from them it is more likely that parts of ‘states’ (for example security professionals) 
would have benefited while others would have lost. 
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